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SEYASAT

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The briefing of the fifth issue of Seyasat

The Institute for Public Policies (IPP) has issued recently the fourth edition of Seyasat that includes writings from several well known Arabic and Palestinian scholars, Seyasat says in the editorial of its fifth issue describing the context in which this new edition appears stating that " President Abu Mazen's initiative to launch a national dialogue was not listened to carefully. The initiative, which could have constituted an exit of the crisis did not receive more than media approvals. It became obvious that the amount of lost opportunities confirms one fact that the Palestinian case will not move an inch despite all the calls and desires . On the contrary, the deteriorated national relations with an unprecedented volume of arrests carried out by the organs of Hamas targeting Fatah offices and charities. Those arrests reached the first rank in the movement and the PLO, such as Dr. Zakaria Agha member of the Executive and Central Committees and leadership of the movement and its secretaries general in the governorates beside Hundreds of activists and supporters.

Besides the closure of some radio stations such as The Voice of the People affiliated with the Popular Front, all in reaction to the explosion on the beach of Gaza with no clue whatever that Fateh has anything to do with it. All this at a time when Hamas reached a truce with Israel which Israeli describes as the most committed. In general ,with the issuance of Seyasat we can describe the internal situation as calm on the external front and a heated internally, where the solution is?

To answer this question Seyasat provides a set of studies, articles and various hubs that whole contribute in highlighting the Palestinian case.

And Dr. Ali Jerbawi from Bir Zeit University writes on "The impact of changing international environment on the Arab - Israeli conflict". Dr. Jerbawi begins by subtracting a bundle of questions about the nature of the current international system in terms of the nature of actors, the possibilities of its future development, radical

changes affecting the structures and its building and the nature of the relationship between the players within it. Above all, what is the role of Arabs in all these transformations that may occur within the international system and how it will affect their cases?

Here is the core idea for Dr. Jerbawi. What are the implications of what is currently happening on Arabs and the Arab situation, particularly on the fate of the Palestinian cause and the Arab – Israeli conflict? Will they be able to engage positively and effectively in the process of demarcation of the new system and benefit from it in achieving what is being said that the interests of Arab nationalism?

Dr. Jerbawi reviews the concept of international system and intellectual vision that prevailed in American literature of the nature of America's role in this system as the dominant power before he moves on to discuss the impact of the environment on international Arab-Israeli conflict, and the position of Muslim and the Arabs.

He also suggests that Arabs possess many of sources of power. But to be able to convert these sources to actual strength, they have to work to achieve four outstanding requirements:

First, the Arabs will not be able to protect their national interests unless they acted as Arabs, and not as peoples of different countries conflicting with each other. The next era is the era of large conglomerates, which without every nations and countries can not, regardless of their capabilities, be able to protect themselves or their interests. If they wanted to preserve and protect the interests of self-orientation they have to move toward national unity rather than division. Secondly, there can be no such Arab Union and Arab political systems if it lacks democracy¹.

Therefore, the requirement of progress on the path to achieving Arab unity depends on democratization in the Arab world. The Arab countries should reflect the will of its citizens.

Thirdly, Arabs have to revitalize themselves at the international level and diversify their diplomatic mobility to establish relations with the various international influential forces. Arab relations must be cemented with Russia, European Union, China, India and the Soviet Union and Japan, in addition to Southeast Asia and Latin America and

Africa. The consolidation of these relations must become significantly by expanding the network of economic, political, military and cultural relations between the Arabs and these forces, so as to break the American monopoly of the region. Fourthly, to achieve a shift in the international environment towards the Arab - Israeli conflict, they have to change the way their dealings with Israel. The forces currently rising in the international arena, or even in the United States, would not be "more catholic than the Pope" and take a firmer line in regard with Israel than those taken by the Arabs themselves.

Dr. Benoit Challand from the European University Institute in Florence writes "On Civil Society and Foreign Donors in Palestine: A Critical Study" In the first part of the paper (Section 1) he discusses some of the assumptions underpinning civil society promotion and discuss briefly why there has been too much optimism. He suggests a renewed operationalizable definition of 'civil society', independent of its location. In Section 2 he looks at who are donors in general, and specially those involved in civil society promotion. Indeed, there has been a tendency to conceive of civil society as framed only within domestic boundaries, but there is an increased need to look at the international dimension of civil society promotion and the impact of external aid. He then moves on to look at a brief evolution of civil society as framed within Palestine and bridge the previous considerations on donors (Section 3). Finally, Section 4 (entitled "Where to go?") reflects on the current situation in Palestine and how the question of civil society can be one of the way out of the current crisis in the Territories following Hamas' coup last June.

As Dr. Challand concludes part of the problem of the Palestinian civil society lies in the concept of 'civil society' itself and in the way it is envisioned and embodied in a variety of programmes and narratives, both international and local. Plus, the fact that Oslo did not deliver the expected dividends for the majority of the population exacerbated the previous problems. Rather than 'putting the blame' exclusively on international actors, who, in keeping with the dependency theory, would make of NGOs a 'transmission-belt' between world centers and the Palestinian (semi-)

periphery, or on blaming Palestinian NGOs only, we argue that though some of the force for heteronomy stems from the way international donors promote certain limited vision of civil society, the concept of ‘civil society’ itself has, within the Palestinian field, three dimensions of exclusionary power.

The first dimension is ideological, for its disputed definitions of civil society promoted by local actors reinforced abstract divides within Palestinian society for being ‘civil’ or not, and over all, maintains – if not increases – the artificial divide between Arab-Middle Eastern societies and their western liberal counterparts. The second is a political exclusionary power, because ‘civil society’ is not only deeply embedded within the narratives of Palestinian factions, and because of this, there is a confusion between political work and developmental work that is not always playing into the hands of NGOs (since some can attack them on having a hidden agenda). Third and finally, ‘civil society’ entails a sociological exclusionary dimension because it presides over the logic of specialization, networking, and internal dependency of large groups upon the specialization of few NGOs. In other words, NGO activities contribute to a system of increased class differentiation, with NGOs adding weight to the middle class and serving beneficiaries of the lower classes (rather than being an emanation of these classes as it was the case until the early 1990s).

Moreover, Palestinian NGOs have been caught in a two-tier negotiation process. The upper part involves interaction (and in some best-case scenarios, deliberation) with international donors to get funding and the lower part involves interaction between the NGOs and their local populations/constituencies. NGOs have been trapped in a time warp with international donors; whereas, the local population, because of the increased economic difficulties of the Oslo and post-Oslo years, has moved towards different (in general much more conservative) ideologies. This hiatus or distance that grew between local NGOs and their bases, would help to explain why there are attempts on the side of NGOs of repoliticizing their actions, or at least, returning to local forms of assistance and political justification

Seyasat in large discusses the idea of international peace forces as a solution to the Middle East conflict. Its introduces an article and an essay review the benefits and pitfalls of the concept.

Dr. Nathalie Tocci a Senior Fellow at the Istituto Affari International in Rome, and a Research Fellow at the Centre for European Policy Studies in Brussels , writes an article entitled "An International Force in the Occupied Palestinian Territories: Beware of Quick-Fix Solutions!"

She writes that particularly since the war between Israel and Lebanon in the summer of 2006, there has been much talk of sending an international force in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPTs). The idea has been aired from different quarters especially in Europe. Israel has cautiously spoken in favour of the idea, particularly since its disengagement from the Gaza Strip in 2005, the war in Lebanon in 2006 and Hamas' takeover of the Gaza Strip in 2007; while the Palestinians, and in particular President Mahmoud Abbas, have voiced their support for the initiative especially since June 2007. Representatives from the international community, and in particular from the European Union, have suggested that such an eventuality may be both possible and desirable. In the fall of 2006 for example the governments of France, Spain and Italy jointly declared their willingness to consider a peacekeeping mission in the Gaza Strip, possibly to be extended also to the West Bank depending on its effectiveness and success.

The concept of an international force in the OPTs has taken different forms, reflecting different ideas regarding its nature and format. Some have spoken of a UN force, essentially reproducing the example of UNIFIL II in southern Lebanon. In view of Israel's long-standing scepticism of the United Nations, others have spoken of NATO as well as of the European Union as principal actors engaged in military stabilization. NATO's contribution would bring with it considerable American involvement in the peacekeeping enterprise. Israel would presumably encourage this in so far as the US is Israel's principal ally. In addition, while far from being viewed as an impartial third party mediator by the Palestinians and indeed the entire Arab world, the US certainly commands the acceptance and respect of all parties in view of its power political status

in the Middle East and worldwide. Indeed realist scholars within the conflict management tradition, argue that “powerful” albeit partial third party mediators may well prove more effective and more acceptable to the conflict parties than “weak” yet impartial ones. Third and finally, many have spoken of a EU force, in view of the precedents set by the Union’s ESDP missions EU-COPPS and EU-BAM-Rafah, as well as its already high level of involvement in the Occupied Palestinian Territories in view of its high level of financial assistance.

There have also been several ideas being floated regarding the actual mandate of an international force in the OPTs. On the lighter end of the spectrum, some have spoken of an observer force, resembling an operation, albeit on a larger scale, of the Temporary International Presence in Hebron; UNSTO (UN Truce Supervision Organization), deployed in Palestine since 1948; UNDOF (UN Disengagement Observer Force), deployed on the Israeli-Syrian border; or the MFO (Multinational Force and Observers), observing the implementation of the agreement between Israel and Egypt. The idea here is that of an unarmed international force, without a veritable peacekeeping mandate, that would be deployed both in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, to monitor developments on the ground.

Then she moves to discuss *The Potential Benefits of an International Force in the Occupied Palestinian Territories: Insights from Theory and Practice*

Before trying to answer the real question "But does the Promise of International Peacekeeping Really Hold Water? "

Three fundamental reasons related, not to the theory of international peacekeeping, but rather to the empirical realities of the Middle East and the role of the international community in it.

- a. The danger of partiality
- b. A breach of ceasefire
- c. The deployment of an international force without a strategy

Dr. Tocci conclude that

an international force, like economic or technical assistance, can certainly prove to be an effective asset to induce and incentivize conflict management, settlement and resolution. It can help stabilize a conflict zone, induce an end of violence and thus open the way to a veritable reconciliation between conflict parties. In principle this could well be true of putative international force in the Occupied Palestinian territories. This all the more so given that the idea of an international force appears to have garnered support amongst both Israelis and Palestinians, and has been spoken of with favour by Europeans in particular. Yet an international force, if effective, cannot be an instrument of diplomacy, an instrument to alter the incentive structure underpinning violent conflict. To act as such an instrument it must be underpinned by an effective and well-crafted strategy based upon a careful assessment of the incentives and motivations driving conflict parties. Without such a strategy, so often missing in international mediations in the Middle East, an international force, just like economic assistance, perpetuates the dynamics of conflict rather than reversing them. By being deployed within a particular power political configuration it may end up doing little to reverse it, and, by mitigating the most acute manifestations of violent conflict, may in turn prolonging the duration of an intractable conflict such as the Israeli-Palestinian one.

Continuing its research in the idea of international Peace forces in Palestine, the editor-of-chief Dr. Atef Abu Saif writes an article in the corner of essays entitled "International Force: How Palestinians can benefit from the idea".

which has become one of the ideas that finds a place at the table in the Middle East. Everybody talks about international forces in occupied territories. But of course the difference between all parties is not in the presence of these forces or not, but in the mandate given to it and its nature. The late President Yasser Arafat was the first to say clearly that the Palestinian people in need of international protection to protect it from the brutality of Israeli military might.

Many international actors and stakeholders have become increasingly convinced that such a presence might be an important input in resolving the remedial intractable

conflict in the Middle East. Lately, Israel came to consider such presence as a try and how to adapt it to serve its security interests with the growing international acceptance of the idea. What has changed in the international context and in the Israeli understanding. Dr. Abu Saif analyzes the positions of the different players concerning the idea. He warns of the intentions of some international powers to hang the role of international forces to being an international police to impose security in Palestinian cities, perhaps especially the Gaza Strip.

Europeans have talked and are talking about expanding the experience of observers in the Rafah crossing, they said of expanding the force to all border crossings between the Palestinians and Israel and between them and the outside world, Karama crossing with Jordan and Karni crossing and the safe passage and of course the Gaza airport and seaport. They see in the experience of observers despite some pitfalls a great success and inferred that work smoothly during times of nature and even after the crisis. This has to do with the border context of the European foreign policy and the nature and role of Europe in the world,

Says Dr. Abu Seif.

For Israel, it seeks to adapt the idea for serving Israeli interests, such as to make the Force a police guarding the borders and to prevent the firing of rockets on the settlement belt around the Gaza Strip. In other words the international forces would become indirectly operating under the command of the Israeli army.

Then Dr. Abu Saif comes to the most important question in all this, "What we want as Palestinians?" We must think of how to take advantage of the general political mood about the possibilities of the idea. He suggests thinking in the exploration of the positive aspects of the idea and trying to neutralize the negative ones, so we do not find ourselves drifting behind what we do not know or rejecting the rates what we are not aware of. Because we might have to answer questions we do not have answers such as what is the nature of this force, what it is formed from? Of NATO forces? Of

U.S. forces in the most? Arab forces may also be wished? Or European? Or what. What kind of mandate given to it? When is over? What is the checklist of these forces?

In the essays Ahmed Abdel Rahman, a member of the Revolutionary Council of Fateh movement and its official spokesman, writes on the status quo and the vision of the movement of the overall developments in the Palestinian situation, providing an explanation and a historical summary of the relationship of the Fateh movement with the Arab regimes and how these systems have always tried to control the PLO through the support of this faction or that organization. The vision of Fateh says Abdel-Rahman was based on the importance of "independent" Palestinian decision and to maintain close relations with Arab countries in order to preserve the issue. From this entrance Abdel Rahman moves to discuss internal Palestinian situation and the relationship of Fateh and Hamas where he believes that the coup of Hamas and actions remanded the Palestinian case back to the first square and subjected it to the regional powers. The other is what Hamas practices on the ground does not reflect a political and national understanding that preserve the higher interests. From the coup to what he called free truce and political arrests and house demolitions. What is needed from Hamas as the title of the article Ahmed Abdel Rahman proposes, is returning to the flock, not singing outside.

The author Akram Muslim, managing editor of Seyasat, writes an article entitled "Hamas" and Gaza: political rhetoric, when carrying more than it can afford ", attempting to explore the mind of the founder of Hamas ideological and political speech. What Akram suggests that there is something that can expose the statements of Hamas leaders and reveal Practices in Gaza. Hamas foreign policy and internal violence options after the coup reveal, several things, and entice a series of conclusions that the writer grabs with the following: "Hamas" sets its time according to it factional timing. The tyranny of religious "Ta7leel" is ready, or even impose a personal reason for people, such as "Ta7leel" the participation of "Qassam" in the arrests.

There is insistence from a trend in " Hamas " on pushing sacred things as ablution, and illuminating descriptions of the type of " friends of God, " in the spiral of political crime. There are no political partnerships profiles in the practice of Hamas. Shelling residential areas and expand the area of violence. The emergence of a new language contents of a new section of the national vocabulary stigmatization of the other of kind of apes and pigs is not an excuse for excluding or moral justification for its uniqueness or hegemony, or waiver of immunity for political or legal, but the dehumanizing.

Dr. Samir Awad, head of political science department at Birzeit University writes an article entitled " Report of the Palestinian case discussing the internal factional developments after President Mahmoud Abbas call for dialogue and the position of Hamas, which outlined this call as Dr. Awadh suggests about it as conditioned position. The writer then moves to discuss the president's visit to Damascus and negotiations with the Palestinian factions, then the writer discusses the calming held by Hamas with Israel through Egyptian mediation.

Seyasat assigns, the coming U.S. elections in the next November, an article by researcher Amany Al Kerem, entitled " American presidential elections between hawks vision of McKean and Obama tendency for change. " After reviewing the importance of elections within the context of current U.S. domestic and international developments and the role of America in the world, she reviews how the presidential elections holding in America besides discussing the issues which occupies a prominent place in the elections of 2008, according to the researcher, foreign policy and national security and economy, especially in light of U.S. involvement in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, in addition to the slope of the economic situation and the decline in the dollar exchange rate and increased unemployment rate and the decline indicators of the financial markets and the current energy crisis of rising oil prices.

Then the writer moves to discuss the policy of each candidate and electoral propaganda. she believes that Obama bases on his strategy for winning on 'change' and this is what is put in his slogan " Change We Can Believe IN " which presents a vision

where different in form and substance of American policy and a different image of what it was during the previous eight years of Republican rule and neo-conservatives. He opposes the war on Iraq since the start viewing it as a reckless war Rash war and was believed that the completion of Afghanistan first. This is a courageous stance at a time when most Americans, including politicians themselves cheese Democrats opposed the American presidency at that time, which exploits the White House situation which left by September 11 in passing their policies to the Congress and American public opinion. Obama faces a series of challenges not simple in facing his rival McCain and perhaps the most important of which is unifying Democrats around him after the fierce battle which led to obtain his party's nomination from Hillary Clinton, few experience in foreign policy and legislative record, which he focuses on issues facing the American home against a stubborn and veteran championships Military, political and legislative honored record.

While McCain appears in the form of traditional American military hero and political veteran who sacrificed years of his life in the service of America, he fought in Vietnam and signed in the grip of enemies and families for five years received their various colors of torture. In addition, he belongs to a fighting family, is the son of an ancient naval Chief Admiral and Admiral grandson. There is no doubt that this picture of American nationalism piece raises nationalist sentiments in the United States and enjoys respect the American people and show McCain that he was the strongest and most capable in dealing with problems such as terrorism and the repercussions of the situation in Iraq. With regard to both, foreign policy towards the Middle East probably, any of the candidates will not make American policy backtracking on its traditional strategic goals, but both will find themselves before the need to change tactics.

A group of Palestinian internal issues and the truce, which was reached by Hamas and Israel, mediated by Egyptian are brought in this issue around the table of Seyasat symposium. Seyasat speakers are the main four faction agreeing to the truce.

Around the table sit Dr. Ahmed Yousef of the Hamas movement, Sheikh Nafez Azzam of the Islamic Jihad , Kayid Al Ghoul from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and Nasser Saleh for Democratic front in a dialogue administered by Seyasat editor-of-chief Dr. Atef Abu Saif.

In the public policy corner Seyasat presents two studies the first on water and the second about the judiciary.

Journalist and writer, Jaafar Sadqa writes about the water crisis in the Palestinian territories, and as he proposes the subtitle of the study "scarcity of resources and performance problems" There is a crisis facing the Palestinians in the issue of water scarcity on resources and how to manage these few resources the Israel has left. Study reviews the sources of water in Palestine from the groundwater basins to the Jordan River to the eyes and springs. The writer mentions that in Palestine there are 7 underground water aquifers where in the West Bank alone there are about 300 spring spend 51 million cubic meters of water annually. Nevertheless, Israel does not allow for the Palestinians but to consume only 319 million cubic meters annually for domestic use and agriculture.

Israel captures about 830 million cubic meters of water sources in the Palestinian territories, including 524.7 million cubic meters of water basins, and 86.7 million from the springs flow, in addition to the full quota of Palestinians from the Jordan River water (220 million cubic meters).

The writer then reviews the position of the Oslo on water relationship between the Palestinian Authority and Israel. The Oslo Accords gave the Palestinian Authority the right to further extract 80 million cubic meters from the eastern basin to fill the deficit in drinking water, but this right has not been implemented so far to Israel's refusal to allow the authority to dig wells for the extraction of this quantity. The writer presents three recommendations on three levels on sources issue, to increase the level of available water, the level of distribution and pricing water shortage in the Palestinian territories is currently estimated about 80 million

cubic meters annually, the same amount provided for the transitional agreements between the PLO and the Government of Israel to be filled by allowing the extraction of the authority of the eastern basin, and is activating this text and its cornerstone in solving the water crisis for several years to come. Development of crumbling water control projects and new networks to ensure quality implementation and reduce as much as possible infringements on these networks, which reduces the percentage of wasted water.

The legal scholar and lawyer, Salah Abdel Atti writes on " the reality of the judiciary in the territories of the national authority" in which he aims to monitor the most important developments concerning the judiciary, and the reality of the judiciary in the territory of the Palestinian National Authority during the year 2007, the overall impact of developments on the right of citizens of litigation. He does so through consideration of the right to litigate in Palestine and move to discuss the legal framework governing the work of the judiciary in the Palestinian territories and order court and human abilities and financial resources of the judicial system. Then moves to follow the study subjects related to the determination of the issues and developments in the functioning of the judiciary sector and developments relating to the organization and functioning of public prosecution before he consider the challenges facing the judiciary, and to conclude a series of recommendations.

in the conclusion of his diagnostic analysis study, the researcher Abdel Atti provides a series of recommendations for legislative and executive bodies to develop the effectiveness of the judiciary and improving its services to the public and to protect it. The immediate termination of the state division of the judiciary in both the judiciary and prosecutors, and restore the unity and cohesion to this power as a third authority and enabling it to carry out its duties under the Basic Law and other judicial laws in all regions of the PNA as a geographical one.

Second: the cessation of all forms of interference in the work of the judiciary and the protection of the judiciary and providing material and moral support to achieve security for courts, prosecutors and centers workers.

Neutralizing the role of the judiciary in partisan conflict, and given all the facilities to do its part wither in the investigation of crimes committed during the internal fighting, the killing and abuse and assault on public and private property or offenders to justice, and to give the judiciary role in the consideration of all the crimes and rhythm punishments stipulated in the law on those who found guilty in a fair trial, and not on the validity of a civil court for any other side.

Activating the work of the Legislative Council and the Council. Training of judges in the management aspects of the case to ensure the effectiveness of the work done and the judge of the issues without delay. To increase the percentage of the budget of the judiciary in the public budget, raising the financial allocations for court expenses, and pay greater attention to transactions and privacy of the judges in their careers and financial management and the reduction of slowdown and delay in order to preserve the prestige of the judge and independence. By prosecutors and the executive and judiciary authorities going to activate censorship on arrest sides and investigation to ensure the promotion of fair trial guarantees for the accused before it. Speeding up of constitutional judges rehabilitation and the formation of a high constitutional court in accordance with the law.

In the corner of international affairs Egyptian scholar Bashir Abdel Fattah writes a lengthy study entitled "Turkey is rediscovering its regional role ". Bashir study begins by saying that the Turkish politics can be understood, both internal and external, in the light of a biological or duplication of the situation of Turkey. Turkey has, for decades, built the pillars of the international presence and its regional role on its ties with strong international players such as the United States and the European Union through membership of NATO and its potential membership in the EU. In addition to its endogenous military capacities and abundant water resources, along with betting to seize opportunities when regional developments or international relations changes

such as launching an effective strategic alliances with Israel to appease the West during the cold war, and maximizing the role of Turkey and its regional strategy in the region at the expense of the American Iranian relations after the Iranian Islamic revolution in 1979.

Three important developments have occurred recently that would have urged the Turks to reconsider that strategy. First, the arrival of the Government of the Justice and Development Party to power in Turkey in 2002. Second, the U.S. occupation of Iraq in 2003 and resulted in the escalation of tension in Turkish-American relations. Third, the EU hesitation to accepting Turkey's membership. Axes the researcher studies carefully and in presenting an analysis of the first shift by the infiltration of warmth to the relationship of Turkey after the its ruling by Islamists and Arab neighbors, which was reflected in the volume of visits, trade and political rapprochement. In the context of debate about the conflict with America after the occupation of Iraq he records escalated tension in relations between Ankara and Washington in the wake of confusion Turkish interests in Iraq following the U.S. occupation of Iraq and the Kurdish alliance is being considered by Turkey of much of the growing mistrust of the success of Ankara fears Iraqi Kurds in the establishment of State of Kurdistan, on the Turkish-Iraqi border with American support. Add to all this apparent faltering in Turkey's membership in the European Union. The answer to all that was given to the Islamic rear and relations with the Arabs and developing new tools for Turkish foreign policy was to participate in international forces in different places, and to engage in mediation between Israel and Arabs in particular Turkey, the preoccupation with the Palestinian file that takes advantage of the close relationship with Israel and the positive image Arabs began to take from Turkey after the victory of justice and development party. As the writer suggests the regional role of Turkey is big as like its location and large size of interlocking relationships with both regional and international parties, a role that Turkey re-exploration after the pitfalls of its relationship with the West European and U.S.

In the corner of book review, Seyasat provides satisfactory and adequate review of Anna Lee Moore's , "Financial support for the Palestinians after Oslo: political guilt and wasted money " published by Routledge in April 2008. In general this is an important book for anyone who wants to review the first ten years of the age of PNA and the way in which international community dealt financially with the authority. Although the book does not offer solutions or recommendations which would help to overcome the criticisms made to the PA and to the International, it provides a clear vision about the politicization of higher pay and how that intent was behind the financial support of maintaining the peace process alive.

Following its tradition, Seyasat provides a set number of books published recently. This includes ; Israel and the family of UN. national State and Jewish human rights by Alexander Iehobesonand Amnon Rubinstein, and "international politics for the democratization" by Nuno Svriano Tekcyria, and "the Palestinian governments: 1994-2006" edited by the political bureau of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and Anthony Aldo book " Blair's Britain, 1997-2007"